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Installation of the Missile Defense System in Redzikowo as a Target of Russian Propaganda Attacks

Shaffafiya 2025-12-15


The installation of the missile defense system in Redzikowo has been, and continues to be, a target of Russian propaganda attacks. The latest iterations rely on disinformation and issuing threats against Poland.

Below, we outline selected narratives used in recent days by Russian propaganda. A significant role in these activities has been played by operatives of the influence apparatus—so-called “military experts,” whose statements were promoted through propaganda outreach channels.

Current Lines of Persuasion:

🔴 The missile defense system is aimed at undermining Russia’s security.
🔴 The base in Redzikowo threatens Poland’s security, leaves Russia no choice, and invites the risk of nuclear retaliation.
🔴 True Poles are being forced into subjugation under American dominance. The base in Redzikowo symbolizes the loss of Poland’s sovereignty.
🔴 The base is supported by Russophobes who disregard ordinary Poles—the victims of anti-Russian provocations.

The Russian propaganda system continues its efforts rooted in disinformation about an aggressive, offensive Poland and NATO, allegedly posing a threat to Russia’s security. The base in Redzikowo has repeatedly been woven into this false narrative over the years. An analysis of the main themes reveals the key lines of Russian propaganda narratives over the past five years:

🔴 It is a result of the imperialist policies of the United States.
🔴 It increases the risk of war and nuclear annihilation.
🔴 It was a reason for the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
🔴 It will lead to the death of half the population of Poland and Europe.
🔴 The installation has an offensive and provocative character.
🔴 It is designed to carry nuclear warheads.
🔴 It is part of U.S. efforts to dominate and occupy Poland.

Shafafiya

A public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the frame of “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025: The European Dimension and Countering Disinformation” contest

The publication expresses only the views of the author and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

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