On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself.
The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West.
Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all
European provocations.” It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized.
“Western” voice in the service of Russian propaganda: the case of Warren Thornton in the Arab infoshere
On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself.
The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and
suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West. Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all European provocations.”
It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized.
Thesis and context
The statement of the “British journalist” Warren Thornton, who described Europe’s reaction to the drone incident over Poland as “ridiculous”, was quickly seized and amplified by Kremlin-controlled or affiliated media, also in Arabic versions. This is a classic example of privileged citation of actors from the West in order to lend credibility to Russian narratives in the MENA region. RT Arabic published a material signaling this opinion and embedded it in a broader stream of content downplaying the incident and undermining the credibility of Poland and NATO.
The above actions are an element of a coordinated influence operation, whose goal is interpretive dominance: blurring Russia’s authorship, insinuating “Ukrainian provocation”, ridiculing the reaction of Warsaw and the Alliance.
Who is Warren Thornton?
Thornton is a niche commentator and a pro-Kremlin blogger, and not a recognizable British journalist, as suggested by Russian propaganda channels. He has a documented history of spreading disinformation about Ukraine (he was detained in the UK in 2023 in connection with publications deemed by the police as misleading). In 2025, he became famous for the thesis about “1.8 million” Ukrainian soldiers killed (a number without a basis), which the Russian media turned into a “news story”.
How do Russian (including Arabic-language) media use Thornton?
Fast amplification: materials in Russian services (Runews24, OSN, aggregators) expose quotes from Thornton, titling him as a “British journalist”, which is intended to give the appearance of external impartiality.
Embedding in the Arabic content stream: RT Arabic amplifies the statement and at the same time publishes lines consistent with the Kremlin’s message (“Poland accuses without evidence”, “maybe it’s a mistake”), creating for the recipient the impression of a consensus.
Recycling of earlier theses: the same “person from the West” previously provided catchy, extreme narratives, which were duplicated by pro-Russian media and niche portals as the “voice of a British journalist”.
Identified manipulative techniques
Appeal to (false) authority / testimony of an authority – giving credibility to the message by appealing to a supposed authority from the West (“British journalist”). In reality, he is a peripheral actor, but the label “British journalist” is supposed to act as a halo effect. Example: titles in Runews24/OSN and RT Arabic.
Information laundering / information washing – a controversial thesis (e.g., “1.8 million victims” or “hysterical EU”) is presented by a Western commentator, then “washed” by a network of pro-Russian media as an alleged fact from an external source.
Cherry-picking / card stacking – selectively exposing individual voices
(Thornton) and omitting the dominant reaction of the West (unequivocal condemnation of the violation of NATO space) to create an image of “widespread doubt”. Contrast: positions of leaders and news agencies vs. RT Arabic narratives.
Framing / framework interception – shifting the burden from “who violated Polish space” to “are Poland and NATO not panicking”. The “panic” framework is reinforced by caricatural language (“childish hysteria”).
False balance / false equivalence – juxtaposing baseless insinuations (“maybe Ukrainian provocation”, “maybe a mistake”) with findings and assessments of institutions, as if they were equivalent. RT Arabic regularly publishes shots of “both sides say…”, neutralizing Russia’s responsibility.
Deflection & blame shifting / blame deflection – suggesting that it is Ukraine or the West that is “escalating”, which fits into the set of frameworks observed after the incident: minimization, “unknown objects”, shifting the blame, ridiculing the reaction of Poland.
Astroturfing & coordinated amplification / simulation of grassroots support – multilingual, rapid replication of the same narrative (Rus./Eng./Ar.) by different domains, which creates the illusion of a broad social echo. Examples: Runews24 → aggregators → RT Arabic.
Why a “Western” actor in the Arab information space?
Legitimize the Kremlin’s message to audiences skeptical of Russian media: “even a Brit says…”.
Undermining the credibility of NATO and Poland: the framework of “overreaction” and “lack of evidence” is intended to soften the assessment of the real violation, which we observe in the entire narrative package after 10 IX.
Polarization and erosion of trust: the goal is to lower trust in official communications and strengthen chaos and emotions (mockery/outrage) while reversing the chronology (perpetrator–victim).
How to recognize and neutralize similar operations?
Verify labels: “Western journalist/expert” – check the achievements and reach, before you recognize credibility. (In the case of Thornton – a marginal commentator, repeatedly reinforced by pro-Russian media).
Search for primary sources: does a Western government/alliance/credible agency confirm the message?(Reuters/AP/NATO/EU institutions).
Identify the framework: if the emphasis is on ridiculing the victim and “symmetry of blame”, this is a signal of a manipulative framework (framing/false balance).
Pay attention to duplication: the same quote in many domains at the same time is often not a “consensus”, but coordination (astroturfing).
Conclusions
The case of Thornton shows how a single, peripheral actor from the West can become a multilingual carrier of the Kremlin’s narrative (including, among others, in the Arabic-language space) thanks to a combination of false authority, information washing, cherry-picking and astroturfing. From a Polish point of view, this is an element of a larger puzzle after the incident of 10 IX: “interpretive dominance” instead of a dispute over facts. Recognizing these patterns and sticking to the communications of institutions responsible for security limits susceptibility to influence operations.
Example sources of quotes and mentions
RT Arabic – material with a quote from Thornton and messages marginalizing Russia’s responsibility/insinuating “lack of evidence”: https://arabic.rt.com/world/1710880-روسي-بعصا-صحفي-بريطاني-يهاجم-رد-الفعل-الأوروبي-على-حادث-الطائرات-المسيرة-ببولندا/
Runews24 / OSN / aggregators – Russian-language amplifiers of the quote about “hysteria” and “childish screams”: https://runews24.ru/politics/12/09/2025/russkij-s-palkoj-britanskij-zhurnalist-raskritikoval-reakcziyu-zapada-na-inczident-v-polshe
EADaily / Voennoe Delo – earlier reinforcement of the unverified thesis “1.8 million” (Thornton as a source): eadaily.com/en/news/2025/08/05/nato-american-genocide-ukraine-has-lost-1-8-million-soldiers-since-the-smo-began-thornton
Ukrinform (fact-check) – Thornton’s profile as a propagandist spreading false theses about Ukraine: ukrinform.net/rubric-factcheck/4023405-how-russia-used-brit-for-propaganda.html
Disinfo Digest – frameworks and goals of the information operation after the incident (interpretive dominance, blurring authorship, ridiculing the reaction): disinfodigest.pl/2025/09/11/dominacja-interpretacyjna-jak-kreml-rozgrywa-incydent-z-dronami-nad-polska/
Editorial note: All quotes from Russian media (including Arabic-language ones) are cited as examples of disinformation narratives. We do not identify with their false content.
