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Disinformation: Belarus and Russia Defend Ukraine from Aggressive Poland.

Shaffafiya 2025-11-06

Disinformation: Belarus and Russia Defend Ukraine from Aggressive Poland

Recently, social media and news channels linked to Russia and China have been intensifying their propaganda campaign aimed at MENA countries, presenting Poland as the aggressor and Belarus and Russia as defenders of Ukraine. There is a clear narrative line in propaganda sources linked to Moscow and Beijing, which is intended to cause confusion and undermine the credibility of Poland and its allies.
The media coverage attempts to present Belarus and Russia as forces defending the stability of the region from Poland’s “imperialist ambitions.” This narrative fits into the broader context of Russia and China’s strategic influence on audiences in Arab countries, who may be less familiar with the actual events in Eastern Europe. Creating an alternative reality, where Poland is the aggressor towards Ukraine, and Belarus (in alliance with Russia) defends its weaker neighbour, is an example of manipulation, which exploits information gaps and ignorance of recipients in MENA countries.

Manipulation Method

This is a classic example of a disinformation manipulation strategy, known as a “false flag”. By reversing roles and suggesting that Poland is planning aggression, Russian and Chinese propaganda undermines the image of the West as a stable and democratic defender of freedom. This type of disinformation aims to create distrust towards European countries, while strengthening the position of Russia and its allies as stabilizers in the international arena.

Campaign Goal

The goal of this campaign is to arouse sympathy for Russia and Belarus and discourage public opinion in MENA countries from supporting Poland and the West more broadly. Such messages can affect diplomatic and political relations, as well as the perception of the Ukrainian conflict. Russia and China are using these narratives to strengthen their influence in the MENA region, building an image of themselves as defenders of international stability and opponents of “Western aggression.” Such disinformation manipulations can lead to a distorted geopolitical picture in regions far from Europe, which is part of a long-term strategy to undermine the West’s international alliances and influence.

A public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the frame of “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025: The European Dimension and Countering Disinformation” contest.

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