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Since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, there has been a sharp decline in the public activity of the Russian ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev. An analysis of pro-Iranian Shia media in Iraq, which had previously actively promoted Russia, indicates disappointment with Russia, which may explain its decision to temporarily lie low.

The Shia television channel Al-Ahad, affiliated with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group and its leader Qais al-Khazali, published a report on 8 January accusing Russia of “playing in favour of Israel” in Syria and “abandoning the Iranian strategy” regarding the fight against jihadists from HTS, who took control in Syria. This report refers to a conversation broadcast by the Iranian news agency Tabnak between Iranian commanders and General Staff officials, revealing that Assad’s army was corrupt and not only avoided combat but also, under pressure from Russia and others, sabotaged Iranian forces’ attempts to undertake military action in Syria.

The report cited by Al-Ahad also states that the Syrian army did not provide any weaponry to Iranian forces stationed in Aleppo, which led to the rapid capture of the city by HTS and the killing of the Iranian forces’ commander, General Kiomars Purhashemi.

The Al-Ahad report also indicates that Russia supported Israel’s actions following Iran’s strike on the country in April 2024. Citing Tabnak, Al-Ahad states that “Russia turned off Russian radars during Israel’s attack on Iranian commanders in Syria, which is clear evidence of Russia’s cooperation with Israel.” The report further quotes a commander of Iran’s Sepah, who claims that “Russia abandoned Iran’s land strategy aimed at defeating terrorist groups, promising to carry out airstrikes. However, it turned out that the airstrikes targeted residential homes and desert areas rather than the military targets of the Tahrir al-Sham organisation.”
Reports that Assad regime officials, acting on Russian orders, provided Israel with data on the deployment of Iranian forces in Syria to facilitate their bombing emerged as early as mid-December.

These reports were based on leaked documents detailing contacts between the Syrian Ministry of Defence and an Israeli intelligence officer overseeing the operation, known by the codename “Mousa.” This revelation was not particularly surprising, as it had long been known that Russia forbade Assad from activating Syria’s air defence systems during Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria. The only real surprise was that, despite this, Iran supplied Russia with drones, which it later used in Ukraine, while media outlets like Al-Ahad continued to promote Kutrashev’s absurd narratives about Europe, the world wars, and the war in Ukraine.

The Al-Ahad report may signal the beginning of a shift in the narrative of pro-Iranian Shia media regarding the situation in Syria. Until now, they had promoted a conspiracy theory attributing Assad’s downfall to a coalition of Israel, jihadists, Turkey, and the West. To some extent, this narrative aligned with Russia’s efforts to frame Assad’s overthrow within the context of its so-called “lone struggle” against “Western aggression” on multiple fronts, including Ukraine and the Middle East. The recent report exposes the falsehood of this narrative. The open question remains what strategy Russia will now adopt to rebuild its influence among Iraqi Shia groups and whether, by playing on anti-Western sentiments, it will once again succeed in deceiving these circles.

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Compiled by: Witold Repetowicz | shafafiyat.com

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In Jordan’s media environment, the war in Iran is not presented as a distant geopolitical event. It is framed as a development with direct implications for national security, economic stability, and regional balance. This shift is not accidental. It reflects the interaction between the structure of the local media ecosystem and the strategic activity of external actors seeking to shape perception rather than simply transmit information. The key dynamic is not the promotion of a single narrative, but the gradual construction of an interpretive environment in which audiences are guided toward specific conclusions about responsibility, risk, and trust. The Media Ecosystem as a Vector of Influence Jordan’s media landscape operates through a functional balance. Official sources and mainstream outlets emphasize stability, procedural clarity, and institutional authority. At the same time, fast-moving digital platforms and social media accelerate the circulation of information and amplify emotional engagement. External actors do not attempt to replace this system. Instead, they integrate into it. Institutional messaging is reinforced by emotionally charged content, while fast-paced reporting creates opportunities for selective amplification. Newswire-style content, in particular, enables rapid secondary dissemination, often detached from its original context. As a result, audiences experience an apparent plurality of sources, while in reality operating within a constrained field of interpretation. The Russian Model of Information Influence Russian activity in the region is not based on overt propaganda, but on a layered communication strategy. At the institutional level, messaging is framed in the language of international law, sovereignty, and stability. Russia positions itself as a rational diplomatic actor advocating de-escalation and political solutions. At the media level, outlets such as RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic adapt this framework to mass audiences. They emphasize divisions within the West, highlight uncertainty in decision-making processes, and foreground the economic and security costs for the region. At the agency level, content distributed through newswire formats achieves high penetrability. Some of these messages introduce ambiguity or unverified elements, increasing informational friction and uncertainty. This structure does not impose a single narrative. It creates an ecosystem in which interpretation is guided rather than dictated. Strategic Objectives The primary objective is not to align Jordan or the broader region with a specific geopolitical bloc. The goals are more indirect and cumulative. First, to reinforce the perception that the conflict is “someone else’s war,” while its consequences are borne by regional actors. This framing encourages caution and strategic distance. Second, to weaken trust in the West as a coherent and reliable partner by highlighting divergences in policy and intent. Third, to position Russia as an alternative diplomatic actor capable of understanding regional realities and acting pragmatically. Fourth, to anchor the conflict in economic and energy-related concerns, making it more tangible and relevant to everyday life. Why These Narratives Resonate The effectiveness of these narratives lies in their alignment with existing sensitivities. In Jordan, internal stability, economic security, and avoidance of external entanglements are central concerns. Messages framed around sovereignty, cost, and regional risk do not appear foreign. They resonate with established patterns of perception. Repetition across multiple platforms further reinforces credibility, even when the underlying sources are interconnected. How to Respond The first step is to distinguish between information and interpretation. Not all analysis is neutral; some content is designed to guide conclusions rather than explain events. The second is source verification. The presence of identical information across multiple outlets does not necessarily indicate independent confirmation. The third is awareness of emotional triggers. Content that provokes fear, urgency, or anger is often structured to maximize reach rather than accuracy. The fourth is maintaining trust in credible sources while applying consistent critical evaluation. Conclusion Jordan’s media ecosystem is not a passive recipient of external influence. It is an active environment in which narratives interact, compete, and reinforce one another. External actors, including Russia, operate within this system, adapting their messaging to local dynamics and sensitivities. Understanding these mechanisms does not require rejecting external information. It requires recognizing that information can function as an instrument of influence, shaping perception as much as it reflects reality.
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